suggest that the Commission is less likely to approve mergers that they link to markets that are less contestable. In addition to protecting competition, the Commission is simultaneously protecting other public interests. Therefore, our research supports the hypothesis that the Commission consistently applies its legislative remit.
Introduction
In the past, which was an era of widespread state intervention in economic activity, merger control in developing countries was not a priority, Adhikari & KnightJohn (2004) . More recently, both internal and external to these economies, the need for competition legislation became apparent. Internally, the privatisation of entities operating in sectors believed to be natural monopolies, such as the utilities sector, as well as the adoption of liberalisation policies, highlighted the importance of a framework capable of eliciting the most favourable efficiency and welfare outcomes in relation to both liberalisation and privatisation. Externally, a wave of international mergers, with potentially negative impacts on local market contestability, highlighted the need to develop tools and legislation to deal with increased multinational corporation market power, and the potential for abuse of dominant positions in local markets.
In South Africa, the transition to democracy in 1994 led to fundamental changes in the form and function of the state and the role of regulatory authorities tasked with helping achieve the government's broader economic development objectives.
Merger decisions, the focus of this analysis, play an important role in determining the future structure of economic activity, and, therefore, are expected to influence economic development objectives. The passage of the Competition Act in 1998 (Act no. 89) in South Africa, which resulted in the establishment of the Competition Commission and the Competition Tribunal in September of 1999, was an important step in this process. The Act replaced a weak merger review system, under the previous Competition Board, in which firms decided whether or not to bring mergers to the attention of the Board, with one that requires pre-merger notification in mergers that exceed certain thresholds.
1
The Commission is an independent body that rules on the appropriateness of mergers, and whose decisions can be appealed to the Tribunal, as well as the Competition Appeal Court. The Act follows mainstream European Union (EU) and, 1 Roberts (2004) provides a brief discussion of some of the assessments made by this board between 1993 and 1997. to a lesser extent, United States (US) competition law by prohibiting practices in restraint of trade, whether vertical or horizontal. However, the legislation differs from the processes followed in most developed economies, since it also promotes underlying social and economic objectives to assist in addressing the previously skewed nature of economic activity in the country. The Act explicitly emphasises development and the public interest, linking competition policy with other economic development policies.
2
The public interest concern has led to some controversy.
3 Reekie (1999) , for example, argues that employment should solely be an objective of macroeconomic policy, and that previous ownership imbalances will be automatically rectified by the removal of socially biased legislation. However, Lewis (2002) notes that public interest and related concerns have been allayed via conditional approval of certain mergers, rather than outright prohibition; many mergers have been conditionally approved, where the conditions are specifically aimed at minimising job losses.
4 In addition to employment issues, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) -an affirmative action program -has also featured in merger hearings. 5 Also, according to the Act, if a proposed merger is likely to be anti-competitive, the authorities are required to consider the possibility that technology or efficiency gains may offset those anti-competitive effects.
Given the broad objectives contained in the Act, as well as fundamental changes in the structure of industry and the regulation of markets, it is worthwhile examining the efficacy with which the Commission is able to execute its requirements.
To this end, this research considers the determinants and the consistency of one aspect of the Commission's remit -merger approval -over the period from fiscal year (FY) 2002 through FY2009 using a sample from the population of notified mergers. The analysis also considers the investigation process, to the extent possible, by examining the determinants of merger categorizations. The sample includes 310
observations, weighted to the population of 2277 merger decisions, from which complete data could be captured. Binary regressions of unconditionally approved vs.
prohibited and conditionally approved mergers, based on linear probability models, were analysed, as were oredered logit models of the classification of mergers as non-complex, complex and very complex. The results of the analysis find a number of significant determinants of the Commission's decision-making process. Unconditional approval is more likely when there are low barriers to entry into the market, when other countervailing market power exists to mitigate any anti-competitive effects of the merger, and when there is evidence that either the industry or the market is growing or is otherwise very dynamic. On the other hand, mergers are more likely to be either conditionally approved or prohibited when post-merger market shares are larger, there is concern over coordinated effects, and when public interest concerns are raised. These same variables are important determinants of the complexity of ther merger, as classified by the Commission. The results suggest that the Commission is following both the letter and the intent of the Competition Act, as initially published in 1998, amended in 2001.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section, Section 2, describes the limited literature related to the examination of merger decisions by competition authorities worldwide. Section 3 outlines the data and sampling procedure used to extract the data for this study. Section 4 outlines the empirical methodology used in the analysis. The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, those results are discussed further, providing links, where possible, to the rest of the literature; possible extensions to this research are also discussed.
Literature Review
In the United States, competition regulation primarily follows the 1890 Sherman Act, although the legislation, the enforcement guidelines and behaviours have changed since then. Posner (1970) on a series of thresholds with respect to the Hischman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), are followed. They find that these simple guidelines are not closely followed by the FTC, suggesting that other factors were at play; only 43% of the cases were challenged, even though nearly all violated the HHI guidelines. They also find evidence of political effects on decisions, suggesting that merger decisions are not consistent. In South Africa, the same political party has been in office, since 1994; therefore, it is not possible to directly consider political effects in the following analysis.
6 Kovacic & Shapiro (2000) present a detailed historical perspective on the shape of, especially, policy and enforcement in the U.S., since the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. 7 Posner's (1970) database was later updated and the relationship between enforcement behaviour and the US busincess cylce was again considered by Ghosal & Gallo (2001) . They apply causality tests related to both Granger (1969) and Geweke, Meese & Dent (1983) Khemani & Shapiro (1993) find that the market share of the acquiring firm was associated with increased enforcement severity, as are barriers to entry, while import competition was associated with reduced enforcement severity. They also find evidence of enforcement differentiation, in the sense that all of the ordered probit cutoffs are significant. They interpret their results Outside of North America, Weir (1992) and Weir (1993) examine data from 77 United Kingdom (UK) mergers applications, submitted between 1974 and 1990.
These analyses have particular relevance to our study, as they concern the 1973 Fair Trading Act, which allows for the public interest to be taken into consideration, and the public interest can override economic considerations. Weir (1992) suggests that public interest was not an important factor. However, he did find a bias in favour of mergers, which he interpets as inconsistent behaviour. Using the same data, Weir (1993) focusses on the factors that made it more likely that the Monopoly and Mergers Commission (MMC) expected increased or decreased competition.
His results suggest that the MMC considers different evidence, depending on the expected change in competition, which then has effects on their decisions. In other words, although behaviour is broadly consistent, it is nuanced, as was found with respect to the FTC. Davies, Driffield & Clarke (1999) , rather than considering mergers, examine the probability of adverse findings in cases of abuse of monopoly power, drawing on 73 MMC reports from 1973 to 1995. They find that the market share of the largest firm, exclusivity in pricing or distribution, and a time dummy are consistently the most important determinants in their series of regressions. The significance of the time dummy can be interpreted as inconsistency in behaviour.
In the following analysis, we also make use of time dummies to uncover potential inconsistencies in the South African Commission's decisions.
With respect to the EU, Nilssen (1997) analyses the consistency of the Norwegian Competition Authority, following a case study approach, finding inconsistency in the Norwegian Authority's behaviour based on data from the non-life insurance industry, which is a highly concentrated industry that appears to contain a competitive fringe. In addition, Lindsay, Lecchi & Williams (2003) The preceding studies provide the basis for this analysis. In the previous studies, the authors examine the consistency of the decisions made by the competition 8 An interesting extension of this research program is the consideration of stock market effects of merger decisions, as undertaken by Duso, Neven & Röller (2007) and Röller & Neven (2002) . Both find that approximately 75% of merger prohibitions correspond to mergers that were considered anti-competitive by the stock market. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. 9 Another strand of the literature investigates the potential impacts of competition authority behaviour on markets, and future merger applications. See, for example, Ivaldi & Verboven (2005) , Neven & Zenger (2008) and Seldeslachts, Clougherty & Pita Barros (2009) . Developing the appropriate counterfactuals is, however, quite complicated in these settings. or large (a combined post-merger turnover at or above the higher threshold).
10 All intermediate and large mergers, based on either the size of the combined entity or the size of the target firm, are required to be notified to the Commission. Intermediate mergers are decided upon by the Commission, with provision for the parties to appeal Commission decisions to the Competition Tribunal for adjudication. Large mergers are initially considered by the Commission, which makes a recommendation; however, the matter must be referred to the Tribunal for final adjudication. The Tribunals decision on large mergers may then be appealed in the Competition Appeal Court. Small merger notification is voluntary, and the Commission restricts investigations to small mergers it views as being problematic, due to previous contact between the parties, the parties being involved in current investigations by the Commission or those in priority sectors. Taking the Commission's merger categorization system as outlined above, the total population available for examination is described in the Targert Population columns of 14 The initial sample sizes for the strata were based on a proportional allocation.
This however, resulted in very low sample sizes for the smaller strata and these numbers were then adjusted, resulting in a disproportionate sample ratio. To accommodate this disproportionality, weighting of the realised sample was necessary to reflect the population sizes of the strata, based on the inverse of the inclusion probability. The effectiveness of the sampling strategy is illustrated in Table 1 ; see, in particular, the columns Sample Population and Sample. Although it is clear that not all samples are perfectly representative, weighting the data to match the underlying population corrects this problem. Given the nature of the reports, a number of variables had to be subjectively determined. Specifically, reports rarely included a direct statement in agreement with the basic definition of any of the dummy variables, and, therefore, if it was felt the Commission was of the opinion that, for example, entry barriers were high or that there was significant import competition in the relevant market, entry barriers were assumed to be high or import competition was assumed to exist. Unfortunately, it
was not possible to decipher either the exact level of entry barriers or the degree of import competition from the report.
In evaluating mergers, the main test that the Act requires is for the competition authorities to determine whether a merger will result in a substantial reduction in market competition, which requires the consideration of a range of factors relating to actual and potential competition in the relevant markets, as set out in Section In addition to the aforementioned factors, we also made provision for the type of merger -conglomerate, horizontal or vertical -the investigation phase -noncomplex, complex or very complex -the merger category -small, intermediate and large -and the fiscal year in which the merger was notified. Furthermore, as discussed in earlier sections, the Act also makes explicit provisions for public interest concerns within the analysis, and, therefore, if these concerns were raised and noted in the report, an indicator for public interest concerns was created.
Finally, provision was also made to include a control accounting for concerns over coordinated effects within the industry in which the merger was proposed.
Each of the included variables captures our interpretation, from the reports, of the Commission's expectation of the effect that any particular merger would have on competition, as well as controlling for potential differences in behaviour over the fiscal years being studied. A summary of the control variables is available in Table   2 , and that summary is provided for both unconditionally approved mergers and † , STEVEN F. KOCH ‡ AND RICHARD J. GRIMBEEK * mergers that were either conditionally approved or prohibited. Within the table, we also report whether or not the underlying mean of the independent variable is estimated to be significantly larger in either the unconditionally approved subsample or the conditionally approved/prohibited subsample. 
Empirical Methodology
The outcome variables avaialable in the data are categorical. These variables include merger decisions: approve without conditions, approve with conditions, or prohibit. In addition to merger decisions, the data collection process also provided information on merger phase, either non-complex, complex or very complex, which is also part of the Commission's merger analysis process. Therefore, empirically, data was available for analysing both final merger decisions, denoted y 1i , and investigative categorisation, denoted y 2i .
For the analysis of merger decisions, the outcome variable is binary.
(1)
1 If merger is prohibited or conditionally approved.
0 If merger is approved without conditions.
Given the binary outcome variable, the analysis follows the Linear Probability
In equation (2), X i is a vector of control variables describing the merger, while β is a vector of parameters to be estimated. There are two disadvantages associated with the LPM. The first is that underlying model is heteroskedastic, as the variance of the error term is binomial, and depends on the variables in the model. This problem is easily corrected through heteroscedasticity-consistent estimation of the regression. The second is that the predictions from the model could lie outside the unit interval, such that the model predicts probabilities that do not strictly follow the rule of probabilities. However, as predicted probabilities are not the focus of the anlayis, this last concern can be ignored. The LPM framework also has a few advantages. The first is that the estimated parameters are the marginal effects, which eliminates the need to calculate non-linear marginal effects. The second is that quasi-separation in the data does not eliminate observations from the LPM.
For our purposes, it is important to note that public interest concerns were not raised for any of the approved mergers. If public interest concerns were included and the analysis followed either probit or logit, mergers in which the public interest was raised as a concern would not have been included in the analysis, as they would have perfectly predicted the outcome of either prohibition or conditional approval.
For that reason, the LPM, which calculates an average effect, is superior, since it can use all of the data in the sample. Finally, due to the fact that the data was sampled, sample weights were included in the analysis, such that the estimates match the population.
For the analysis of the investigative process, the outcome variable takes on three values that are rankable. (4) 
In equation (5), Λ represents the logistic distribution function: exp(ν) (1+exp(ν)).
A normal distribution function could also be assumed, but the difference in the marginal effects would be minimal. From this probability, and the preceding assumptions, the likelihood function can be constructed.
In equation (6), y 2ij = 1 if y 2i = j, where j = {1, 2, 3}. As with the LPM, the ordered logit regressions and marginal effects, discussed below, are weighted to match the population of mergers.
Unfortunately, the estimated coefficients from the ordered logit model do not provide much useful information, and, therefore, marginal effects for each investigative level were, instead, estimated, at the mean of the data, and standard errors of those marginal effects were calculated via the Delta method. Given the probabilities defined in equation (5), marginal effects can be uncovered via either calculus, in the case of continuous independent variables, or via differencing, in the case of discrete independent variables. For a continuous variable x ik ∈ X i , the marginal effect on p ij can be estimated from the following equation.
For a discrete variable x i ∈ X i , the marginal effect on p ij can also be estimated.
Importantly, as there are three different outcomes in the ordered probability model, there are three different sets of marginal effects addressing the separate probabilities of any merger falling into any of the three categories. As can be seen in the tables of marginal effects for the ordinal models, the sum of the marginal effects is zero, as it should be: since all of the probabilities sum to a constant, in this case one, the derivative of those probabilities with respect to any variable will sum to zero.
Results
Two sets of empirical analyses were considered, one set based on linear probability models and another based on an ordered logit model. Each of these analyses provide information related to the determinants of particular decisions; assuming weak exogeneity of the explanatory variables, the results can be interpreted to be causal. The plausibility of that assumption is also discussed. The results from the analysis are located in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Each of these analyses are discussed, in turn, below.
5.1. Linear Probability Model I. The first analysis focuses on fiscal year differences in decisions, which provides some evidence about the consistency of merger decisions through time, as well as the relationship between investigation phase and decisions. The results, although useful, are not likely to be causal, since there could be differences in the actual mergers in any particular year, while investigation phases could also be related to various features of each merger.
The model is estimated for all mergers in the database, as well as for vertical, horizontal and conglomerate mergers, separately. The columns in Table 3 represent results for the respective analyses. Unfortunately, there are very few conglomerate mergers in the dataset, such that the determinants of conglomerate merger decisions are imprecisely estimated. However, for both vertical and horizontal mergers, as well as for all mergers, sample sizes are much larger. Therefore, the following discussion will focus on those regression results. are associated with an increase in the probability that a merger is not approved; for each percentage increase in the market share of the combined merger, the probability of either conditional approval or prohibition rises by between 0.6% and 0.8%.
Furthermore, for all mergers, if the investigation is recorded to be complex, the probability of unconditional approval decreases by nearly 11%; for vertical mergers, the decrease is closer to 17%. Very complex mergers are even less likely to be approved than complex mergers. For all mergers, the probability of either conditional approval or prohibition is 22% higher for very complex mergers. For vertical mergers, the estimate is 26.5%, and for horizontal mergers, 19.7%. Although the Commission appears to behave inconsistently, a conclusion of this nature is premature, as there are at least two potential concerns that were not captured in this analysis, that could matter. The first is that it is not possible to control for merger applications that are either not notified or have been withdrawn; some parties may have decided that their merger would not be successful, and, therefore, withdrawn the merger application. The second is that there could be other factors that are more prevalent in certain years or certain types of mergers that are more common in some years than others. Unfortunately, the first concern cannot be dealt with in this analysis, and, therefore, it will remain as a caveat for all subsequent analyses. The second concern, however, to which we turn, below, can be addressed, at least in part.
15 A formal test that fiscal year effects are simultaneously zero is rejected for all mergers (F 7,299 = 2.37, p = 0.02), vertical mergers (F 6,83 = 3.36, p = 0.01) and horizontal mergers (F 7,209 = 2.30, p = 0.03.
Ordered Logit Analysis of Investigation Phase.
In the preceding analysis, investigation complexity was found to be an important determinant of merger decisions at the Commission over the decade of the 2000s, while differences in decisions were observed across the fiscal years. However, the complexity of the investigation is an indicator of the investigation process, through which, the Commission considers mergers. For that reason, merger complexity was analysed separately, in an effort to uncover whether market contestibility factors were related to the Commission's complexity ranking. Marginal effects from the analysis are presented in Table 4 .
Table 4 about here
The analysis suggests that combined market shares, the unavailbility of market share information, potential coordinated effects, potential import competition, market dynamics and growth, a history of collusion and barriers to entry are all important determinants of the Commission's complexity classification. Specifically, mergers are more likely to be classified higher on the complexity scale if combined market shares are larger, there are concerns over coordinated effects, if there is potential import-based competition to the merger, if markets are more dynamic, and if there is a history of collusion in the merging market. On the other hand, higher barriers to entry and a lack of information on the combined market share are associated with higher complexity ranks. For the most part, these results are consistent with our intuition about market contestibility, with the exception of the effect of import competition. In order to understand this counterintuitive result, it is important to recall the definition of complexity discussed in Section 3.1. More complex mergers are likely to undergo a more stringent analysis, such that information related to import competition is more likely to be recorded in more complex mergers than in non-complex mergers. In other words, it is quite plausible the cause and effect is not correctly captured, at least with respect to import competition.
To be more precise regarding the relationships, mergers with low barriers to entry are 10% more likely to be classified as non-complex, 6.5% less likely to be † , STEVEN F. KOCH ‡ AND RICHARD J. GRIMBEEK * classified as complex and 3.9% less likely to be classified as very complex. Similarly, if market share data is missing, that merger is 17.2% more likely to be classified as non-complex, but 10.9% and 6.4% less likely to be classified as complex or very complex, respectively. Possibly, this result is driven by the commission not conducting detailed market share research on mergers it deems as non-complex. On the other hand, if there is a history of collusion in the market, a merger is 16% less likely to be classified as non-complex, but 10% and 6% more likely to be classified, respectively, as either complex or very complex. For import competition, mergers are 11.1% less likely to be deemed non-complex, but 7% more likely to be deemed complex and 4.1% more likely to be labelled as very complex. In addition, if there are significant dynamics in the merging market, a merger is 13.2% less likely to be labelled as non-complex, but 8.3% more likely to be deemed as complex and 4.9% more likely to listed as very complex. Finally, if there is a concern over coordinated effects in the market, the estimates are 24.5% less likely to be non-complex, 15.4% more likely to be complex and 9.1% more likely to be very complex.
5.3. Linear Probability Model II. In the preceding analyses, merger complexity was found to impact merger approval at the Commission between FY2002-FY2009, while approvals appeared to be inconsistently determined through time.
Furthermore, merger complexity was found to be associated with various measures of market contestibility. Therefore, in a follow-up analysis, a reduced form linear probability model, in which the market contestibility variables replace merger complexity as determinants of merger decisions, are considered. Those results are reported in Table 5 , and are reported in the same way as the results in Table 3 .
Table 5 about here
As with the initial analysis, the determinants of conglomerate merger decisions are generally not precisely estimated, due to small sample sizes, but are presented for completeness. In this analysis, low barriers to entry are associated with a reduced probability that the merger is not approved; the estimates range between 17% and 28%. Similarly, if there is countervailing buyer power within the market, the probability that the merger is not approved falls by between 20% and 23%.
Dynamic markets are also viewed more favourably by the Commission; mergers in dynamic markets are between 4% and 5.5% more likely to be unconditionally approved, although the vertical merger estimate is imprecisely estimated. On the other hand, if the Commission is concerned with the potential for coordinated effects between firms, the probability that the merger is not approved lies between 24%
and 60% higher than for mergers in which coordinated effects are not a concern.
In addition to the previously discussed market contestibility factors, the model also included each of the fiscal years to examine the consistency of Commission behavour through time. As previosuly discussed, it is possible that the observed inconsistency in the behaviour was being driven by differences in the types of mergers that were sampled for the anlaysis. Formal tests of joint significance across each of the subsamples suggests that the inclusion of market contestibility measures alleviates the original concerns over dynamic inconsistency in merger decisions at the Commission.
16
Finally, according to the Act, interested parties are allowed to provide arguments against a merger that are based upon the public interest. In the sample data, public interest concerns were raised only in mergers that were either prohibited or conditionally approved. The resulting quasi-separation in the data raises difficulties with respect to both logit and probit models, although does not raise any difficulties in terms of the linear probability model, which partly justifies the focus on linear probability models. One potentially unsurprising result of that quasi-separation is that public interest concerns are found to be an important determinant of Commission disapproval. However, as Lewis (2002) notes, public interest concerns were not used to block mergers, although those concerns often resulted in some conditions being applied to those mergers. Constantinou's (2012) analysis suggests that some SUNÉL GRIMBEEK † , STEVEN F. KOCH ‡ AND RICHARD J. GRIMBEEK * of these conditions, at least with respect to the merger between Momentum and Metropolitan, were viewed as inefficient by stock market participants.
Discussion and Conclusion
This research has examined the determinants of and the consistency with which the Competition Commission has evaluated merger transactions notified during the period from FY2002 to FY2009. Data was extracted from a population of 2277 mergers, and the analysis, undertaken in three parts, hinged upon linear probability models corrected for our sampling strategy, as well as ordered logit models of investigation complexity.
In line with economic theory, as well as the guidelines set out by the Act, the However, complexity effects are found to depend on market contestibility.
Although the results initially suggested inconsistent behaviour through time;
however, the introduction of market contestibility measures changes that view.
When market contestibility variables are included in the analysis, year effects are found to be insignificant, suggesting that the initial observation of dynamic inconsistency at the Commission was an artefact of omitted variables bias. For the most part, the remainder of the results from the analysis confirm intuition. For example, coordinated effects in the market are treated more skeptically. On the other hand, minimal barriers to entry are associated with more contestibility within the market, and, therefore, the merger is less likely to be regarded as anti-competitive by the Commission. Similarly, mergers that occur in relatively more dynamic markets are more likely to be approved, as are mergers in markets in which there is countervailing buyer power. As expected, mergers in markets that are more competitive are generally viewed more positively, while mergers in markets that are likely to be less competitive are viewed more skeptically. These results, related to the underlying level of competition and determinants of competition, are similar to that found by Coate & McChesney (1992) , Weir (1992) , Khemani & Shapiro (1993 ), Bergman et al. (2005 and Avalos & De Hoyos (2008) .
Finally, the Commission takes seriously its responsibility to protect the public interest. When such interests are raised by parties concerned with the merger, the Commission takes notice. In this sample, if a stakeholder was concerned with potential negative impacts on the broader public, the Commission was much more likely to either place conditions on the merger or prohibit it completely. This result, however is not easily compared to the literature, since the public interest is not an explicit goal of competition policy in most countries. Weir (1992) Our analysis is one of the few to examine competition policy in South Africa, having considered more recent and more detailed data than either Theron (2001) , SUNÉL GRIMBEEK † , STEVEN F. KOCH ‡ AND RICHARD J. GRIMBEEK * Smith (2003) or Roberts (2004) . Similarly, it is one of the first to examine merger policy in a developing middle income country; the only other analysis we were able to find was for Mexico by Avalos & De Hoyos (2008) . Given the changes in the structure of industry in developing economies, driven in part by privatisation and a recent increase in international mergers, the analysis contributes to a rather small, but growing, literature on the enforcement of competition policy in developing economies.
Although the results support our intuition, a few caveats remain. Importantly, the estimation results may, instead of pointing to consistent behaviour at the Commission, point to consistent interpretation of the merger data, since a degree of subjectivity was necessary for the compilation of the dataset. Even though it is not possible to further examine our subjectivity, a recommendation to the Commission arises from the analysis. A more succinct data capturing process at the Commission would be beneficial. We would also note that it was not possible to control for the entire decision-making process, including the investigators and directors making recommendations or the discussions surrounding those recommendations.
Although not necessarily relevant to our analysis, it would be interesting to see if a subgroup of investigators or other actors in the Commission were more or less likely to approve any particular merger. Finally, the analysis assumes that the target population, and, therefore, the sample population, is representative of mergers.
Given that Commission behaviour is likely to influence the applications received, as was found by Seldeslachts et al. (2009) This research only addresses the determinants and consistency of the Commission's decisions with respect to mergers; however, it paves the way for future research into the market's reaction to merger notifications. In particular, future research could investigate whether or not stock markets appropriately price the stocks of merging entities, analysing whether or not stock markets internalize the Commission's most likely decision, along the lines of the analyses performed by Aktas, de Brodt & Roll (2004) , Duso et al. (2007) and Ivaldi & Verboven (2005) .
Furthermore, research into the post-merger performance of merged entities and the markets in which these entities operate would provide evidence related to the appropriateness of the principles contained in the Act. 
